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MUSIC AND VAGUE EXISTENCE
David Friedell
Abstract: I explain a tension between musical creationism
(the view that musical works are abstract artifacts) and the
view that there is no vague existence. I then suggest ways
to reconcile these views. My central conclusion is that, al-
though some versions of musical creationism imply vague
existence, others do not. I discuss versions of musical cre-
ationism held by Jerrold Levinson, Simon Evnine, and Kit
Fine. I also present two new versions. I close by consider-
ing whether the tension is merely an instance of a general
problem raised by artifacts, both abstract and concrete. I
argue that on at least one defensible account of music the
tension is especially problematic for abstracta. I focus on
musical works, but much of the paper straightforwardly
applies to other kinds of abstract artifacts.
1 Introduction
Abstract creationism about music—or musical creationism for short—is the
view that musical works are abstract artifacts.1 Abstract artifacts, roughly,
are objects with no spatial location that people create. Other potential
abstract artifacts include fictional characters, words, corporations, novels,
poems, treaties, contracts, cookbooks, and reggae bands.2
This paper is about musical creationism and vague existence. Many
theorists think there is no vague existence (e.g., Lewis 1986, Markosian
1998, and Sider 2001). I take no stand here. I instead focus on whether
musical creationism implies vague existence. It is compelling to think, as
Daniel Z. Korman (2014) suggests, that realism about abstract artifacts
(musical or otherwise) implies vague existence. The basic idea—to be
explained in more detail below—is that if there are abstract artifacts, then
it’s indeterminate when people create them and thus indeterminate when
they first exist. And, the idea goes, the only way to account for the
1 Levinson (1980) and Evnine (2009) are both musical creationists. Their theories are discussed
below.
2 See Kripke 2013, Salmon 1998, von Solodkoff 2014, and Thomasson 1999 for examples
of abstract creationists about fictional characters. See Kaplan 1990 for a version of abstract
creationism about words and Cole 2004 for one about corporations.
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indeterminacy in this case is to posit vague existence. I agree with Korman
that there is a real tension: a tension between musical creationism and the
view that there is no vague existence. Pace Korman, though, I think these
two views can be reconciled.
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin by characterizing vague existence
(section 2). I then explain the tension between musical creationism and
the view that there is no vague existence (section 3). Next, I suggest ways
to reconcile these views (section 4 and section 5). In doing so I show
that, although some versions of musical creationism imply vague existence,
others do not. I close by considering whether the tension involving music
and vague existence is merely an instance of a general problem raised by
artifacts, both abstract and concrete (section 6). I argue that on at least
one defensible account of music the tension is especially problematic for
abstract artifacts. The paper focuses on musical works, but much of it
straightforwardly applies to other kinds of abstract artifacts.
Before diving in, it’s worth emphasizing the importance of vague exis-
tence. David Lewis (1986, 212–213) and Ted Sider (2001) reject vague
existence to argue for unrestricted composition: the view that any two
or more objects compose an object. Sider’s Vagueness Argument for four-
dimensionalism also rejects vague existence (Sider 2001, 120–149). So
does Ned Markosian’s (1998) argument for brutal composition: the view
that it is a brute fact when composition occurs. The acceptance of vague
existence would accordingly cast doubt on unrestricted composition, four-
dimensionalism, and brutal composition. The acceptance of vague existence
might also vindicate versions of neo-Aristotelianism, such as Simon Evnine’s
(2016).3 It’s intrinsically interesting whether there is vague existence, and
thus it’s interesting whether musical creationism implies vague existence.
But much more is at stake.
2 Vague Existence
Following Peter van Inwagen (1990) and Katherine Hawley (2001, 125–
140), I characterize cases of vague existence as conflicting with the following
principle: if it’s indeterminate whether there exists something that has a
certain property, then there exists something that indeterminately has that
property. This principle may be formally represented as follows:
∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx4
Typically, when it’s indeterminate whether there exists something that
has a certain property, something indeterminately has that property. It’s
indeterminate whether there is a big city in South Dakota, and something
(Sioux Falls) is indeterminately a big city in South Dakota. It’s indeterminate
3 Evnine’s neo-Aristotelianism, as discussed below, implies vague existence.
4 ‘∇’ is an indeterminacy operator. The only sort of indeterminacy considered in this paper is
due to vagueness.
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whether there is a ripe tomato in my kitchen, and a particular tomato is
indeterminately a ripe tomato in my kitchen. To borrow an example from
van Inwagen (1990, 271): if Socrates is the wisest person but is still only
borderline-wise, then it’s indeterminate whether there is someone who is
wise, and someone (Socrates) is indeterminately wise. These cases do not
involve vague existence. The source of indeterminacy in each case is a
vague term (or concept) other than ‘exists’: ‘big city,’ ‘ripe,’ and ‘wise,’
respectively.5
In cases of vague existence, it is indeterminate whether there exists
something that has a certain property, but nothing indeterminately has
that property. Van Inwagen (1990) would say the unhealthy hamster is
such a case.6 Imagine a hamster is dying on a mat. At some time it’s
indeterminate whether the hamster is still alive; it’s indeterminate whether
there exists a hamster on the mat. Many of us would say that something
on the mat is indeterminately a hamster and indeterminately a corpse.
Van Inwagen, however, doesn’t believe in corpses. He believes instead in
simples (i.e., things with no proper parts) arranged corpse-wise. He thinks
simples and living organisms are the only concreta. For him, then, it’s
indeterminate whether there is anything (other than simples) on the mat.
It’s indeterminate whether there is a hamster on the mat, but nothing is
indeterminately a hamster on the mat. Hence, van Inwagen would think
this case is a counterexample to ‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx’ and a case of vague
existence.
I agree with Hawley (2001, 129) that the distinctive feature of cases
of vague existence is that they conflict with this principle. Accordingly, I
take the view that there is no vague existence to involve a commitment to
‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx.’7
3 The Tension Involving Musical Creationism
I will now explain the tension between musical creationism and the view
that there is no vague existence. My explanation is similar to, but more
direct than Korman’s (2014) discussion.8 I begin with Jerrold Levinson’s
(1980) seminal version of musical creationism.
It’s natural to think musical works in the Western classical tradition are
abstract structures (or sequences) of sound types (e.g., the sound a violin
5 Plausibly, in genuine cases of vague existence the source of indeterminacy is ‘exists.’ Korman
(2015, 177–181), however, argues that in some cases of vague existence composition is the
source of indeterminacy.
6 I borrow this case from Hawley 2001, 128.
7 Carmichael (2011) and Noonan (2010) informally prove that supervaluationists who think
‘exists’ is precise are committed to ‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx.
8 Korman (2014) argues that Sider’s vagueness argument for unrestricted composition—an
argument that rejects vague existence—and an analogous argument for anti-realism about
abstract artifacts stand or fall together. My presentation of the tension eschews Sider’s
argument and focuses on the view that there is no vague existence.
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makes when it plays a middle C).9 Levinson rejects this view. He thinks
composers create musical works; for instance, he thinks Beethoven created
the Ninth Symphony.10 But composers do not create sound structures, since
sound structures are eternal (or at least exist before composers engage with
them). Levinson thinks a composer creates a work by indicating a sound
structure. This generates a new object, an indicated sound structure. The
preexistent sound structure still exists, but the indicated sound structure—
which is the musical work—is distinct.11 It is mysterious exactly what
an indicated sound structure is. I discuss related proposals below. For
now, let’s set aside such details and suppose that Levinson’s theory, as just
sketched, is correct.
A problem arises for ‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx.’ When Beethoven indicated a
sound structure that corresponds to the Ninth Symphony, he created the
symphony. When did this happen? The question is difficult for two reasons.
First, it’s difficult to identify even vaguely when indication occurs, and thus,
when a musical work begins. Is it when the composer writes the last note
or makes some physical record of it? Is it when the composer mentally
records the last note? Is it when the composer deems the work complete
by thinking, “Now it’s finished,” or something similar? There’s no easy
answer. This difficulty is one of ignorance. We are ignorant (or at least I
am) about what kind of event generates musical works.12
The second difficulty, more important for our purposes, is one of vague-
ness. Following Korman (2014, 67) we may note that, regardless of which
event generates the Ninth Symphony, it’s indeterminate when that event
happens.13 Suppose Beethoven writes the final note on paper. There’s
no time t such that at t, but not a nanosecond before, the note has been
written. If an ultra-advanced video camera were to film the process at a
billion frames per second, and we were to watch the tape frame by frame,
no frame would strike us as the first to represent the note as having be-
ing written. Similarly, if Beethoven thereupon thinks, “Now it’s finished,”
9 I focus here, as Levinson does, on works in the Western classical tradition. It’s implausible
that works in genres that emphasize improvisation, such as jazz, are sound structures or
even associated with individual sound structures. I think the central issues concerning vague
existence still arise for jazz works, but I will not argue for that here.
10 Musical Platonists (e.g., [Kivy 1983] and [Dodd 2007]) think musical works are discovered
instead of created.
11 Levinson’s view is more nuanced than presented here. Musical works for him are not merely
indicated sound structures, but are indicated sound/performance means structures. The basic
idea is that it’s built into the work not only how it sounds, but also how it is performed,
including what instruments are used. I set aside this complication (as Levinson himself often
does).
12 I am open to the idea that a musical work comes into existence sometime in the middle
or even close to the beginning of the composition process. See, for example, Trogdon and
Livingston (2014) for discussion of when an artwork is complete.
13 Korman similarly argues that it’s indeterminate when Richard Dawkins created the word
‘meme.’
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there’s no nanosecond when that mental event first counts as having hap-
pened. Analogous facts obtain about any event that plausibly generates the
symphony.
This second difficulty reveals that at some time t it’s indeterminate
whether Beethoven has indicated the relevant sound structure. It’s inde-
terminate at t whether the symphony exists. Since it’s Beethoven’s only
choral symphony, at t it’s indeterminate whether there exists a Beethove-
nian choral symphony. ‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx’ implies that at t something is
indeterminately a Beethovenian choral symphony. What thing is it? It isn’t
the sound structure itself, since it (on Levinson’s theory) is distinct from
the symphony. It seems at first glance that nothing is indeterminately a
Beethovenian choral symphony. It seems we have a counterexample to
‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx’ and a case of vague existence.14
One might object that before the Ninth Symphony exists a ‘proto-
symphony’ exists. When it’s indeterminate whether there exists a Beethove-
nian choral symphony, something is indeterminately a Beethovenian choral
symphony and indeterminately a proto-symphony. Even if this is right,
there must be a first abstract object Beethoven creates while composing the
symphony. Whatever it is, it’s problematically indeterminate when it first
exists.
And so we have a problem. It’s hard to reconcile musical creationism
with the view that there is no vague existence. Next, I’ll discuss potential
reconciliations.
4 Perdurantism
Some perdurantist and neo-Aristoelian theories of music offer ways to
reconcile musical creationism with a denial of vague existence. Let us
start with perdurantism. Perdurantists are four dimensionalists who think
ordinary objects persist by perduring—by having temporal parts at every
moment they exist. It makes sense for perdurantists to think sound struc-
tures, despite being abstract, also perdure. Here’s a perdurantist account
of music: a musical work is a mereological sum of a sound structure’s
instantaneous temporal parts (i.e., time-slices) that exist after the composer
indicates the sound structure.15 Perdurantists have similar views about
concreta. They commonly think a clay statue is composed of a lump of
14 I presuppose that the quantifier ranges over only (actual) presently existing objects. This
precludes the defense of ‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx’ that since there is a future Beethovenian choral
symphony it isn’t indeterminate at t whether there is a Beethovenian choral symphony. One
who insists the quantifier ranges over future objects should consider a world that suddenly
ends while a composer has indeterminately created a symphony. Baker (2007, 130–132),
relatedly, invokes eternalism in order to deny vague existence.
15 It’s natural to wonder what exactly a time-slice of a sound structure is. Sound structures—
sequences of sound types—are typically thought to be kinds of sets. The perdurantist will
likely take slices of sound structures to be abstract slices of sets and not sets themselves.
Granted, this ontology is mysterious, but that’s at least partially because abstracta generally
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clay’s time-slices that exist after a sculptor appropriately shapes the clay
(until the clay is no longer appropriately shaped).16
This perdurantist proposal does not imply vague existence. Here’s why.
At some times it’s indeterminate whether Beethoven has indicated the Ninth
Symphony’s sound structure. Suppose these times are t1–t100. Call the
sound structure ‘s’ and the last time s exists ‘tn.’ There is a mereological
sum composed of s’s time-slices from t1–tn. Another sum is composed of
s’s slices from t2–tn. And so forth. Whenever it’s indeterminate whether
there exists a Beethovenian choral symphony, one of these sums exists
and is indeterminately a Beethovenian choral symphony. There’s no vague
existence, just vague symphony-ness. The sums have definite durations. It’s
indeterminate merely which one ‘the Ninth Symphony’ refers to. This story
resembles Lewis’s famous story about the outback:
The reason it’s vague where the outback begins is not that
there’s this thing, the outback, with imprecise borders;
rather there are many things, with different borders, and
nobody has been fool enough to try to enforce a choice of
one of them as the official referent of the word ‘outback.’
(1986, 212)
The perdurantist proposal, though, raises concerns. One issue pertains
to creation. Time-slices of s (the Ninth Symphony’s sound structure),
according to the perdurantist, always come into existence—one at every
instant, in fact. This plenitude of generation occurs automatically without
Beethoven doing anything. Call the mereological sum of s’s slices that
just so happen to exist after Beethoven indicates s ‘SUM.’ Presumably,
SUM would have existed even if Beethoven had never been born. The
perdurantist, however, identifies SUM with the symphony. Thus, although
the symphony on the perdurantist proposal comes into existence at the
time of indication, one might worry the perdurantist cannot make sense of
Beethoven creating the symphony.17
In response, the perdurantist may claim that when Beethoven indicated s
he thereby indicated the symphony and SUM; analogously, the perdurantist
thinks that when you touch a table you touch some of its temporal parts.
Moreover, and this is the crucial point, the perdurantist may claim the sym-
phony is essentially indicated.18 SUM, though indicated, is not essentially
are mysterious. See Sider 2001 for discussion of perdurantism. Caplan and Matheson (2006)
defend a perdurantist theory of music, but on their view musical works are concrete.
16 On the current proposal, a musical work, after being created, exists as long as its sound
structure exists. Some might think musical works cease to exist when there is no record or
memory of them. Such theorists may offer a variant: a musical work is composed of a sound
structure’s slices that exist after a composer indicates the sound structure until there is no
record or memory of the appropriate kind. My remarks apply also to this variant.
17 Korman (2014, 68) raises a similar concern regarding a different conception of words.
18 The perdurantist may also claim the symphony is essentially part of a sound structure that
has been indicated. This claim is less elegant but works the same for present purposes.
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indicated. That the symphony and SUM have different essential properties
might seem to entail they are distinct. But the perdurantist may argue they
are identical. One strategy would be to invoke a counterpart-theoretic
view of de re modality. Another strategy would be to claim the symphony
and SUM are contingently identical.19 I won’t endorse any strategy here.
My point is, there is room for the perdurantist to claim (a) the symphony
is identical to SUM, and (b) the symphony (but not SUM) is essentially
indicated. From (b) the perdurantist may infer that had Beethoven not
indicated s, the symphony wouldn’t have existed, and thus, that Beethoven
did in fact create it via indication.
Another concern with the perdurantist proposal pertains to simultaneity.
Imagine we live in a mirror world: a world with “a symmetry in the
mosaic of events with respect to some spatial axis” (Hawthorne 2007, 429).
When Beethoven indicates s, so does his atom-for-atom duplicate, Mirror-
Beethoven. The two composers are far apart and unaware of each other.
On the perdurantist proposal, the composers’ symphonies are identical
sums, composed of the same time-slices of s. They unknowingly co-create
a symphony. This is odd.20
Things get stranger. Imagine another scenario: everything is as before,
except a quantum miracle causes Beethoven to compose his symphony
a nanosecond before Mirror-Beethoven composes his. On the current
proposal, the composers create two distinct symphonies that sound exactly
alike. The symphonies are distinct sums that share most but not quite all
of the same slices of s; Mirror-Beethoven’s symphony is a proper part of
Beethoven’s symphony. These results when taken together are especially
odd. It’s reasonable to think, as Levinson (1980, 10) does, that people
far apart may create distinct musical works that sound exactly alike. It’s
also reasonable to accept the Platonist view that when people compose
works that sound exactly alike, they merely discover the same work. It
is odd, however, to accept that whether the composers create one or two
symphonies depends on whether they indicate s at exactly the same time. A
nanosecond, one might think, shouldn’t affect the number of symphonies.
The issue is not unique to mirror worlds. It arises in any world where two
composers, unaware of each other, simultaneously compose works that
sound exactly alike.21
19 See, for instance, Lewis 1971 for discussion of counterpart theory and Gibbard 1975 for a
defense of contingent identity.
20 Predelli (2001, 285) makes a similar point about an example raised by Currie (1989, 62). It’s
arguably misleading to say the composers co-create a symphony. For one thing, this phrasing
evokes a sense of teamwork. Moreover, the perdurantist may claim the Ninth Symphony is
essentially indicated by Beethoven and not essentially indicated by Mirror-Beethoven and that
the mirror-symphony is essentially indicated by Mirror-Beethoven and not essentially indicated
by Beethoven. This suggests that only Beethoven creates the Ninth Symphony and that only
Mirror-Beethoven creates the mirror-symphony. It’s unclear how helpful this approach is,
however, since the symphonies still count as being identical.
21 One might worry I’ve illegitimately invoked simultaneity, given Einstein’s theory of special
relativity. But special relativity doesn’t resolve the problem. If we fix a frame of reference, the
444 David Friedell
Perhaps we should not be so troubled by this simultaneity problem.
After all, when discerning the metaphysics of musical works oddness is
expected. Despite the issues raised here, the perdurantist view is worth
further consideration. Some theorists might be particularly attracted to the
view, given that it does not imply vague existence.
5 Neo-Aristotelianism
We now consider neo-Aristotelian proposals. On these proposals, musical
works are constituted by, but distinct from, sound-structures. Similarly,
neo-Aristotelians think clay statues are constituted by, but distinct from,
their clay. Evnine (2009), inspired by Levinson, thinks when Beethoven
indicated s (the Ninth Symphony’s sound structure) he made a symphony
that was constituted by, but distinct from, s. His account implies vague
existence. The reason why is that, for Evnine, constitution doesn’t always
occur. S goes from constituting nothing to constituting something when
Beethoven indicates it. Since it’s indeterminate when indication occurs,
it’s indeterminate when s first constitutes anything in a way that conflicts
with ‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx.’ At some time (around when s first constitutes
something) it’s indeterminate whether there exists something constituted by
s, but nothing is indeterminately constituted by s. Hence, Evnine’s theory
implies vague existence.
Other neo-Aristotelian theories, however, do not imply vague existence.
Kit Fine suggests one. He thinks that for every property an object possesses,
it automatically constitutes a ‘qua object’ (Fine 1982a). The-Eiffel-Tower-
qua-tall and The-Eiffel-Tower-qua-famous are distinct qua objects. Each is
constituted by, yet distinct from, The Eiffel Tower. Fine suggests a musical
work is a sound-structure-qua-having-been-indicated-by-composer-c.22
In order to see that the proposal does not imply vague existence, let us
suppose there are no vague properties. There are merely vague predicates.
‘Bald’ is one. It’s not that ‘bald’ refers to a single property with a vague
extension. Rather, there are many precise properties regarding hair—for
example, having fewer than 999,999 hairs; having fewer than 999,998
number of symphonies depends on whether Beethoven and Mirror-Beethoven simultaneously
indicate s (relative to that frame of reference). This is no less odd than the result considered
above. Also, relative to some frames of reference—but not to others—Beethoven and Mirror-
Beethoven count as simultaneously indicating s. The odd upshot is that how many symphonies
there are depends on one’s frame of reference.
22 Fine, inspired by Levinson, says something similar about stories: “Now when an author
creates a story, he will bear a certain relation, what we may call ‘indicating’, to the abstract
content of the story. We may then say the story is the abstract content under the description
of having been indicated, in the way it was, by the author” (Fine 1982b, 131). Fine thereby
suggests that stories are qua objects. He then claims a similar theory can be developed for
musical works. Evnine (2009) reasonably suggests interpreting Levinson as thinking musical
works are qua objects. In response, however, Levinson (2013, 56) denies works are qua
objects.
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hairs; etc.—and it’s indeterminate which one ‘bald’ refers to. Each is a
precisification of ‘bald.’ This account explains why it is vague when most
actions begin—dancing, singing, walking, etc. When one dances there’s no
exact nanosecond when dancing first occurs; dancing begins at different
times on different precisfications of ‘dancing.’ As Lewis would say, nobody
has been fool enough to enforce a choice of one precisification as the official
referent of ‘dancing.’
‘Indicate’ is also vague in this way. Suppose for simplicity it has 100 pre-
cisifications: indicate1, indicate2, etc.23 A composer who indeterminately
indicates a sound structure indicates it on some, but not all precisifications.
A composer who determinately indicates a structure does so on all such
precisifications. Given that Beethoven has (by now) determinately indicated
s, there are one hundred related qua objects: s-qua-having-been-indicated1-
by-Beethoven, s-qua-having-been-indicated2-by-Beethoven, etc. It’s indeter-
minate which of these ‘s-qua-having-been-indicated-by-Beethoven’ refers to,
and hence (on Fine’s view), to which of these ‘the Ninth Symphony’ refers.
Now, consider a time t when it’s indeterminate whether Beethoven has
indicated s. At t it’s indeterminate whether there exists a Beethovenian
choral symphony. ‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx’ implies that something at t is in-
determinately such a symphony. Fine’s proposal (along with the present
account of vagueness) implies there is such a thing. Here’s why. On some
precisification of ‘indicate’—say, indicate47—Beethoven has indicated s at
t. Thus, at t there’s a qua object: s-qua-having-been-indicated indicated47-
by-Beethoven. This object is indeterminately the Ninth Symphony. It is
thus, indeterminately, a Beethovenian choral symphony in accordance with
‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx.’ There’s no vague existence, just vague symphony-ness.
Moreover, no problem arises about when s first constituted something. Fine
thinks, pace Evnine, that s has always constituted something.
Fine’s proposal relies on a view we may call unrestricted constitution: the
view that for each property an object has, it constitutes a unique qua object.
This view implies there are many more objects than commonsense allows.
There is, for instance, the Eiffel Tower-qua-taller-than-.01-meters, the Eiffel
Tower-qua-taller-than-.02-meters, and so forth. Some will deem this too
high of a cost. But others might find this abundant ontology palatable.
After all, unrestricted composition—the popular view that any two or more
objects compose an object—also implies an abundant ontology. There is,
for instance, the sum of the Eiffel Tower and my nose. It’s not obvious
that Fine’s ontology is any less plausible. Moreover, a common reason for
accepting unrestricted composition is that it is consistent with there being
no vague existence (Lewis 1986, 212–213). Perhaps it is reasonable to
accept unrestricted constitution, given that it also is consistent with denying
vague existence. At least, Fine’s proposal is worth further consideration.
23 I set aside higher-order vagueness.
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6 How General Is The Problem?
It is tempting to think the tension involving music and vague existence is
merely an instance of a general problem raised by artifacts, including con-
crete ones. Imagine making a hammer—a concrete artifact—by connecting
a hammer head to a handle.24 For the sake of simplicity, suppose it is the
only hammer in the world. God has annihilated all others. Intuitively, there
is no exact time when you create the hammer. At some time t, it’s indeter-
minate whether there exists a hammer yet. ‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx’ implies that
something at t is indeterminately a hammer. It’s not obvious there is such a
thing. In this way the creation of the hammer (and other concrete artifacts)
poses a problem for the view that there is no vague existence. This problem
is clearly similar to the one musical creationism poses.25
Moreover, the three extensions of Levinson’s theory considered above—
perdurantism, Evnine’s theory, and Fine’s theory—all handle concrete ar-
tifacts in much the same way they handle music. Perdurantists may say
the hammer is a four-dimensional worm composed of time-slices of the
head and the handle that exist whenever the two are arranged hammer-
wise. More precisely, there are many overlapping worms of this sort, each
corresponding to a different precisification of ‘arranged hammer-wise.’ The
worms have definite durations; it’s indeterminate merely which one is a
hammer. Likewise, Fine could take the hammer to be a qua object: the-
head-and-the-handle-qua-arranged-hammer-wise. More precisely, there are
many related qua objects, each corresponding to a different precisification
of ‘arranged hammer-wise.’ The qua objects have definite durations; it’s in-
determinate merely which one is a hammer. On the perdurantist and Finean
proposals, then, there is no vague existence, just vague hammer-ness.26
This brings us to Evnine’s theory.27 As we have seen, he thinks a sym-
phony is constituted by its sound structure. He would say the hammer is
constituted by its head and handle. His account of the hammer—like his
account of symphonies—implies vague existence. For, at some moment
during the creation of the hammer it’s indeterminate whether there exists
something that is constituted by the handle and the head, but nothing is
indeterminately constituted by them. This result conflicts with ‘∇∃xFx →
∃x∇Fx’ and involves vague existence.
For both symphonies and hammers, then, perdurantism and Fine’s view
do not imply vague existence. In both cases Evnine’s view does. This might
make it seem even more likely that musical works and other abstracta pose
24 I borrow this case from Korman 2014, 66.
25 The problem pertains to the beginnings of concreta and also their endings—for example,
when the hammer is destroyed.
26 Although I’ve supposed the hammer’s parts do not change, perdurantists and Fine can
account for concrete artifacts with changing parts, such as a car that gets new tires. Fine
(1999) invokes the notion of a variable embodiment for this purpose.
27 See Evnine 2016 for his unified neo-Aristotelian theory of abstract and concrete artifacts.
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no special problem for the view that that there is no vague existence. It
might seem that artifacts more generally are the source of tension.
I will now sketch a version of musical creationism, however, on which
musical works and other abstracta pose a special problem. I happen to
think this view is the most promising of those discussed in this paper, but
I will not argue for it here. On the view I have in mind, musical works
are made by indicating a sound structure, but, pace Evnine and Fine, they
are not made from a sound structure. Works are not made from anything.
They are made ex nihilo. Works are also, as Julian Dodd (2007) claims,
unstructured—that is, they have no parts. A work has a sound structure.
But this is not a parthood, constitution, or identity relation. What it means
for the work to have a sound structure is, roughly, that an ideal performance
of the work would involve an instance of the structure. That’s the view in a
nutshell.28
Unlike the perduranist and Finean views, on the ‘ex nihilo’ view, a sym-
phony comes into existence without being ushered in by a plentitude of
similar objects. There are no overlapping worms composed of time-slices of
a sound structure. Nor is there a plenitude of qua-objects. There’s nothing
there, so to speak, and then the symphony—and only the symphony—
‘pops’ into existence ex nihilo. This absence of plentitude leads to vague
existence. When it’s indeterminate whether Beethoven has indicated the
Ninth Symphony’s sound structure, it’s indeterminate whether there exists
a Beethovenian choral symphony. And, since there is no associated plen-
itude of objects, nothing is indeterminately such a symphony. We have a
counterexample to ‘∇∃xFx → ∃x∇Fx’ and a case of vague existence.29
One might prefer neo-Aristotelian theories to the ‘ex nihilo’ view, if
one finds it intuitive that composers create works from abstract parts (e.g.,
sound types). Conversely, a theorist who finds it hard to imagine abstracta
as constituting other abstracta might prefer the ‘ex nihilo’ view. I won’t
try to settle this issue here. What’s important for present purposes is
that the ‘ex nihilo’ view is reasonable. Moreover, although the view is
reasonable when applied to musical works and other abstracta, it does
not extend to concrete artifacts. It’s far less plausible that people create
hammers ex nihilo. People create hammers (and other concrete artifacts)
from something else—for example, a handle and a head. People create
a house from brick, cement, and/or other materials. One can explain
this sort of process—making something from something else—without
positing vague existence.30 I conclude that, if the ‘ex nihilo’ view is correct,
musical works (and other abstracta) offer a special reason to accept vague
existence—a reason concreta do not offer.
One may object to the ‘ex nihilo’ view precisely on the grounds that it
doesn’t extend to concrete artifacts. After all, an advantage of perdurantist
28 This view is similar in some respects to Thomasson’s (1999) artifactual theory of fictional
characters.
29 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helping me to see that the absence of plenitude is
key.
30 We’ve seen two ways this can be done: perdurantism and the Finean approach.
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and neo-Aristotelian theories is that they offer unified accounts of musical
works and concrete artifacts. The ‘ex nihilo’ view, however, might fare
better in other respects. Imagine you’re in charge of the Musical Ontology
Club. One day you announce: “I hereby declare we have a new position: the
treasurer of the Musical Ontology Club; I open the floor for nominations.”
Plausibly, you create an abstract artifact: the position of treasurer of the
club. This happens within a particular social context that includes norms
that enable you, as the leader of the club, to create such a position. But
it seems wrong to say you create the position from such norms or from
your declaration, in the way sculptors create statues from clay. Rather, you
create the position in accordance with such norms by making a declaration.
Arguably, you create the position ex nihilo. If this is right, the ‘ex nihilo’
view of music has an advantage of extending to certain abstract artifacts
beyond music. The view is worth further consideration.
7 Conclusion
There is tension between musical creationism and the view that there is
no vague existence. At first glance, Levinson’s seminal version of musical
creationism implies vague existence. Evnine’s related proposal does imply
vague existence. The perdurantist and Finean views considered above, how-
ever, do not. Some versions of musical creationism, then, are reconcilable
with a denial of vague existence. Nonetheless, an alternative view—that
musical works are unstructured objects created ex nihilo—offers a special
reason for thinking there is vague existence. Two of these views are new:
the perdurantist view and the ‘ex nihilo’ view. I think the latter is especially
promising, but I have not argued for it here. I hope to have shown that all
of the versions of musical creationism considered here are worth exploring
and that some, but not all, imply vague existence. A fruitful way to proceed
would be to think more about what exactly a musical work is.
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